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The publish-or-perish principle has become a fact of academic life in gaining a position or being 
promoted. Evidence is mounting that benefits of this pressure is being countered by the 
downsides, notably by means of scientific misconduct or forms of goal displacement by 
scientists. In this paper we evaluate whether perceived work pressure (publishing, acquisition 
funds, teaching, administration) is associated with different attitudes towards science and the 
workplace among economists working at Dutch universities. Based on latent class analysis one 
can detect a clear divide among economists. Approximately two thirds of the economists 
perceives that this pressure has more downsides than upsides and one third only perceives only 
upsides and no downsides. Work pressure does not seem to drive this divide as both classes do 
not differ in terms of work pressure. Whether one is an optimist or a skeptic of the publish-or-
perish principle is more tied to one’s position in the hierarchy. Full professors see far more than 
other faculty members the positive sides of the publish-or-perish principle.  
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“…when you can measure what you are speaking about and express it in numbers you know 
something about it; but when you cannot measure it, when you cannot express it in numbers, 
your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind” (Kelvin as cited in Merton, Sills, and 
Stigler (1984)). 
 
Kelvin’s dictum has been the guiding principle for many generations of scientists, not in the least 
for economists.1 Measurement is science. It is somewhat of an irony that this dictum has been 
inverted and trickled down in the everyday practice of many scholars in valuing their 
contribution (Moosa, 2018): a scientific contribution only counts as ‘science’ if and only if its 
impact can be expressed in numbers. And to paraphrase Kelvin: if you cannot express the impact 
in numbers, your contribution is of an unsatisfactory kind. Deans, department heads, science 
foundations, grant reviewers, they all rely tacitly or explicitly on the science metrics as the 
number of publications has become excessively large and the different fields within economics 
too specialized to appraise. This so-called metric tide in science, as described and weighted by 
Wilsdon (2016), has progressed and especially in economics the love for measuring 
‘productivity’ and ‘ranking’ is noted to be higher than in other disciplines (Fourcade, Ollion, & 
Algan, 2015). However, the metric tide seems to have reached its limits. E.g., Heckman and 
Moktan (2020) argue that the excessive focus on top journals in economics has become 
dysfunctional. And others also note how engaging in ranking games or the grabbing of attention 
(Klamer & van Dalen, 2002) can potentially harm the way universities practice science, 
disregarding promising methods and topics (Akerlof, 2020), a neglect of key tasks such as 
teaching or academic citizenship (Miller, Taylor, & Bedeian, 2011; Osterloh & Frey, 2015), and 
a disregard for one’s own ideas and publishing what the ‘market’ demands  (Frey, 2003). Part of 
this trend towards goal displacement can also be traced to the allocation of research funds. If one 
wants to earn a livelihood as a researcher it is either ‘funding or famine’ (Stephan, 2012) and this 
drive for funds is generally felt to be strongly connected to a publication record: reviewers are 
often asked to assess the scientific merits of a researcher based on his or her publication record. 
                                                          
1 It is even placed in abbreviated form above the entrance of the Social Science building of the University of 
Chicago (see more (Merton et al., 1984). 
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 The central research question in this paper is how the publish-or-perish pressure affects 
attitudes and perceptions that academic economists have about their practice of science. A two-
step approach is used to tackle this question. First a descriptive question is posed: is the 
publication pressure real and is this pressure dominating other tasks (teaching, acquiring funds, 
administration) of scientists? Second, how do economists perceive the pros and cons of publish-
or-perish principle, are they skeptical or optimistic about the intended and unintended 
consequences of applying this principle (Van Dalen & Henkens, 2012a)? And, more in 
particular, is skepticism or optimism of scholars affected by the work pressure they encounter or 
are their perceptions mainly tied to (dis)satisfaction with how publication pressure affects their 
work environment and the way science as an institution functions? 
To shed light on how the publication pressure permeates academic life, we will use an 
extensive survey held in 2015-2016 among economists affiliated with Dutch universities. To put 
the position of Dutch economics faculties in context, these universities achieved a top position 
within the economics hierarchy in Europe (Kalaitzidakis, Mamuneas, & Stengos, 2003; Lubrano, 
Bauwens, Kirman, & Protopopescu, 2003) and the case of the Dutch could function as an 
appropriate case study for other countries as well because most universities outside the Ivy 
League have similar ambitions in moving up the various rankings. Furthermore, one should take 
note of the fact that economics at Dutch universities is rapidly internationalizing and is certainly 
no longer a Dutch affair: 43 percent of the Dutch economics faculty consists of foreign born 
members (Rathenau Institute, 2018), most classes at economics departments are taught in 
English, and like most US faculties international job markets at European and American venues 
are actively used to attract foreign talent. 
The setup of this paper is as follows. First, we will offer a brief overview of pros and 
cons of the publish-or-perish principle and how it can possibly affect academic work and science 
in general (section 2). In section 3, we will explain the data and methods. Section 4 covers the 
measurement of the work pressure, in which publication pressure figures prominently. This is 
done by measuring the perceived pressure for four types of tasks: publishing, teaching, acquiring 
funding and administrative duties. Subsequently in section 5 we will estimate the consequences 
of the publish-or-perish principle on how economist perceive the circumstances under which 
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they work as well as the functioning of economics as a science. Section 6 concludes and will put 
the findings in perspective. 
 
2. Publish-or-perish principle in context 
The publish-or-perish principle is not novel idea. The eminent science scholar Garfield (1996) 
pointed to the first printed usage of this term in the work of sociologist Wilson (1942) who 
wrote: “The prevailing pragmatism forced upon the academic group is that one must write 
something and get it into print. Situational imperatives dictate a 'publish or perish’ credo within 
the ranks” (p. 197). He guessed that Wilson, being a student of the renowned sociologist of 
science Robert Merton, was expressing a feeling that must have been present among American 
faculty. For the ambitious scholars ‘publish-or-perish’ was initially seen as a sound principle. As 
Beard (1965) expressed it: “advancement and academic recognition shall depend in part upon 
one’s contribution to the published literature of his academic field.” It was seen as good and non-
controversial step, although Beard was not blind to the downsides of this policy and how it can 
jeopardize academic obligations such as teaching. As he notes: “the road to institutional 
distinction is also strewn with tragedies, tragedies that have resulted when an institution's 
ambitions have far exceeded its resources.” (p. 458) 
Within the early economics and sociology of science literature, stressing publication as 
an academic requirement also sound principle. Getting your work into print is closely aligned 
with the priority principle stressed by Merton (1973): the goal of scientists is to be the first to 
communicate an advance in science. Today this communication is done primarily in journals 
managed by scientists who consult their peers to review a contribution. A journal publication can 
hence be seen as the recognition awarded  by the scientific community for being first. This ‘race 
to priority’ is very similar to what economists call patent races or winner-takes-all contests. 
Being first in claiming a discovery can be rewarded by citations or by means of eponymy or 
more formal prizes like the Nobel Prize. However, as Stephan (1996) remarks this economic 
focus neglects the idea that puzzle solving may be an equal important motivating force that 
explains why people participate in science and why winning races is not everyone’s goal in life. 
However, with the emergence of research universities it became necessary to pay close attention 
to the composition of staff that has a taste for advancing science and that is not only interested in 
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the satisfaction of solving puzzles. Universities had to create a work environment in which the 
forces of competition and selection play a major role. The tenure system, also known as up-or-
out contracts (Kahn & Huberman, 1988) are nowadays a common element in most universities, 
although in European universities this system has remained up and the till the turn of the century 
a ‘foreign’ idea. Being able to publish articles that gain wide recognition by one’s peers is seen 
as a precondition of being awarded tenure. Publications and citations could support this decision 
making. Initially scholars and bibliometricians were quite optimistic that citations measured 
quality. For instance, Cole and Cole (1973) claim that “the data available indicate that straight 
citation counts are highly correlated with virtually every refined measure of quality.” And in 
economics, Stigler and Freidland (1979) make the explicit assumption that “The quality of a 
scholar’s work is properly related to the frequency of its citations by his colleagues.” (p.1). 
However, when the metrics became the most common measuring rod in characterizing 
the pecking order in science, bibliometricians warned time and again: impact is not the same as 
quality (Hicks, Wouters, Waltman, De Rijcke, & Rafols, 2015; Martin & Irvine, 1983; Moed, 
2006) and as Adler and Harzing (2009) state their concern about the current ranking systems 
used by universities:  “[these] systems are dysfunctional and potentially cause more harm than 
good.” The optimism that surrounded the use of these indicators may have given economists the 
idea that selection is greatly improved by relying on metrics. Practice turns out that such decision 
are not so simple. This type of disappointment is also illustrated in the paper by Brogaard, 
Engelberg, and Van Wesep (2018) who produce evidence that the tenure system does not seem 
to bring the promise of selecting those scholars who continue producing groundbreaking 
research. As they formulate their conclusion: “It does not appear that academic economists 
respond to the greater professional and intellectual freedom that tenure should provide by 
sustaining earlier research effort or by taking chances that  lead to more home run research.” Part 
of the answer why we see a decline after tenure is in a sense logical as undertaking path-breaking 
work is generally done in the very early stages of a career (Jones, 2010; Van Dalen, 1999), 
although as Weinberg and Galenson (2019) show this may differ in economics on the type of 
research, conceptual economists peaking far earlier than what they call experimental economists. 
An alternative explanation that Brogaard et al. do not consider is the possibility that the amount 
of work pressure increases over a career. The implicit assumption is that tenure is the moment in 
a career when the ‘trial period’ is over, one can tackle any idea one wants. The sample period 
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that Brogaard et al. consider is namely also a period in which the publish-or-perish culture has 
become  more widespread and more intense. In short, the rat race in academia never stops and 
once you have obtained tenure - as, e.g., an associate professor - you have to keep on publishing, 
acquiring funds and teach in order to become a full professor, and when you are a full professor 
the implicit and sometimes explicit targets for funding keep on increasing and time for research 
that matters decreases over time. 
The publish-or-perish culture also resounds in the work by Niles, Schimanski, 
McKiernan, and Alperin (2020) who show how young scholars at academic institutions in the 
US and Canada value the impact factor of journals, the number of publications and other metrics 
at a far higher rate than older and tenured scholars. For those scholars who are involved in 
review processes concerning promotion and tenure these factors are virtually the only ones that 
count but, as Niles et al. make clear, deep down they only care about their work being read by 
their colleagues who work in similar niches in their discipline. They interpret this as a 
disconnectedness among scientists: people who still have to strive for tenure or promotion have 
to believe in the value of impact factors and Hirsch-indexes because that is what counts and that 
is what reviewers of grant proposals will take on board in their evaluation. Contrary to the 
younger faculty, the older and tenured faculty care less about the conventional metrics and they 
choose topics and areas irrespective of whether this attracts a lot of citations and hence they 
disconnect from what they perceive their peers might value.  
This divide noted by Niles et al. is intriguing. Not only may their research explain the 
findings by Brogaard et al. (2018) - why tenure does not seem to work as envisioned - it also 
suggests that one can benefit by taking a look at how actual scientists perceive their work 
conditions. The debate about the publish-or-perish principle is broader than simply monetary 
incentives and productivity. Most faculty members would agree that the publish-or-perish 
principle has benefits, such as the possibility to make the meritocratic principles do their work 
and give everyone the chance to move upward in the hierarchy and improved quality of research 
by peer review. However, the use of metrics as selection criterion as well as the strong increase 
in the number of competitors for a small number of positions in universities, grant opportunities 
of journal outlets has changed the face of science. Think of the excessive number of publications  
that are not cited and hardly read as a reflection of the competition for attention (Laband & 
7 
 
Tollison, 2003; Nicolaisen & Frandsen, 2019; Van Dalen & Henkens, 2004). In some ways this 
can still be seen as reflection of the Matthew Effect (Merton, 1968). But the lack of attention 
becomes different when your promotion or grant application depends on it, and it may change 
the choice of topics or a tendency to neglect national issues for scientists working in non-English 
countries (Van Dalen and Henkens (2012a), or more directly because it is not seen or ‘counted’ 
by university management as a scientific activity. The strong increase in number of scientists has 
led to an increasing number of people wanting to get published, leading to congestion in the 
publication process: finding suitable reviewers, long waiting times for articles being 
printed/published, the rise of fake and low quality journals (Altbach, 2013), and in the case of 
open access journals for which one has to pay a substantial fee2 the urge and sometimes pressure 
felt by editors from publishers to accept and publish mediocre articles can be large (de Vrieze, 
2018). But of course, the most worrisome side effect of publication pressure can be traced to the 
increase in scientific misconduct or unethical publication behavior like data manipulation, 
plagiarism or fraud (Fanelli, 2010; Fang, Steen, & Casadevall, 2012; Martin, 2013; Petersen, 
2019; Seeber, Cattaneo, Meoli, & Malighetti, 2019). 
The increased competition among scientists has also had its implication for funding of 
research as competition for grants has become more fierce and success rates are slim. Established 
researchers (Bollen, Carpenter, Lubchenco, & Scheffer, 2019; Bollen, Crandall, Junk, Ding, & 
Börner, 2017) see that the current system of funding research in general has become too 
bureaucratic and entails high costs on those who write grant proposal as well as the reviewers of 
those proposals. And from different sources this dissatisfaction seems to be well founded. In 
terms of time spent writing grant proposals, Gross and Bergstrom (2019) show that “the value of 
the science that researchers forgo while preparing proposals can approach or exceed the value of 
the science that the funding program supports.” (p. 1) Furthermore, the element of luck in 
obtaining a grant can be quite large as either agreement among reviewers on what is a good 
proposal can be quite low (see for US evidence Pier et al. (2018)) or because - as in the case of 
the Netherlands - review committees are multidisciplinary and members have no intimate 
knowledge of the proposals or of the field and indirectly publication records get a much larger 
weight in making assessments. 
                                                          
2 For instance, fees for publishing in PLOS journals vary in the range of 1,595 to 3,000 US dollars in 2019. 
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3. Method and data 
To assess the impact of the publish-or-perish principle data were collected by means of a survey 
(in English), distributed among faculty members of all economic departments at Dutch 
universities. In line with privacy regulations, the survey was distributed by the deans of the 
separate economics departments among its faculty with a supporting email letter from the dean. 
The group of respondents did not only include tenured faculty, but also non-tenured personnel, 
like PhD students and tenure track assistant professors or research or teaching faculty with short-
term contracts. The field work was carried out between November 2015 to January 2016 and the 
overall response was 453, giving a response rate of 24 percent (which is comparable to similar 
expert surveys, see (Klein & Stern, 2005; May, McGarvey, & Whaples, 2014; Ricketts & 
Shoesmith, 1992; Van Dalen & Henkens, 2012b).3 The survey contained a substantial number of 
questions shedding light on the different tasks that faculty perform within their universities as 
well as their opinion on the how performance is evaluated and perceived within their university 
and their perception of the pros and cons of using publication and citation metrics, or how 
personal values impact scientific practice (Van Dalen, 2019). These attitudes and opinion 
questions will be introduced later on, but at this point we want to introduce the variables which 
are important to see whether the position one has in academia might impact one’s perception of 
the work pressure. For now it suffices to sum up the most salient characteristics (see Table 1) of 
our sample of economists. The average age in our sample is 40 years, 33 percent of the sample 
has a foreign nationality and 23 percent of this sample is female. The various positions that one 
can fulfill is varied but reflect adequately the various positions in Dutch academia. The average 
respondent has reported that he or she has published 1.8 articles in international refereed journals 
(with an impact factor of Web of Science) in the past year, which is more or less in line with the 
norm that some universities use to grant tenure.4 Assistant professorships can cover fixed term 
contracts (tenure track) or permanent contracts. Associate and full professors are always tenured. 
Special endowed chairs at Dutch universities (‘extraordinary professor’) can be funded through 
external funds, i.e. private companies or foundations. These ‘professors by special appointment’ 
                                                          
3 Not every question was answered by respondents and for some analyses the ‘don’t know’-option was not included 
yielding different numbers of observations. 
4  For instance, the Erasmus School of Economics stipulates as one research criterium for promotion to associate 
professor an annual publication record of 1.5 peer-reviewed articles or papers in international peer-reviewed 
journals. See their Criteria for appointment and promotion as of May 2016. 
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are often appointed on a fixed-term and part-time basis, and often have a full-time position in a 
firm, government agency or another university/research institute. 
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables 
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
Work pressure (10-point scale)     
    Teaching courses 6.43 2.03 1 10 
    Publishing research 7.84 1.80 1 10 
    Acquiring research funds 6.22 2.55 1 10 
    Administrative duties 5.49 2.38 1 10 
Publication record past year     
   # International refereed articles 1.81 1.91 0 11 
Age (years) 41.55 11.35 24 69 
Gender (male = 0) 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Nationality of birth (Dutch = 0) 0.34 0.47 0 1 
Academic position     
   PhD student 0.21 0.43 0 1 
   Temporary contract/post-doc 0.06 0.24 0 1 
   Assistant professor 0.28 0.45 0 1 
   Associate professor 0.18 0.38 0 1 
   Full professor 0.23 0.42 0 1 
   Extraordinary/emeritus professor 0.04 0.21 0 1 
University of employment     
   University of Amsterdam 0.13 0.34 0 1 
   Free University Amsterdam 0.13 0.33 0 1 
   Erasmus University 0.13 0.34 0 1 
   Tilburg University 0.15 0.35 0 1 
   University of Groningen 0.20 0.40 0 1 
   University of Maastricht 0.12 0.32 0 1 
   University of Utrecht 0.06 0.23 0 1 
   University (combination)a 0.09 0.29 0 1 
     
N = 319 
(a) For matters of small numbers we have collapsed the responses from economists of the universities of Delft, 








4. Measuring and explaining the work pressure 
The work pressure measurements are central in this paper and the statistics in Table 1 show 
unequivocally that of all the regular academic tasks the publication pressure is perceived to be 
the highest with a value of 7.8 on a 10-point scale (with 1= no pressure at all; to 10 = extremely 
high pressure). Publications are frequently used in national research assessments, rankings, 
internal allocation of funds across departments within universities and of course in internal 
assessments of functioning. The pressure to teach (6.4), acquiring research funds (6.2) and 
administrative duties (5.5) are  substantially lower. The fact that on average these tasks generate 
less pressure than publication is plausible because certain ranks within the universities (e.g., 
PhDs in their start-up years) are not thoroughly involved with acquiring funds, teaching or 
administration.  
 
Figure 1: The perceived high work pressure in Dutch economics departments for a number 
of academic positions, 2015-2016 
 
Note: very high pressure is here defined as respondents reporting an 8 or higher on the 10-points scale of pressure in 





























teaching publication funding administration
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Figure 1 brings across how the pressure mounts across career positions with economics. When 
we talk about the work pressure this pressure is felt not only by young researchers, but virtually 
by all academics who want to pursue a career in science. As one can detect in Figure 1, the 
publication pressure is highest among those who want to attain tenure or are set on becoming a 
full professor. What makes things complicated is that the pressures are jointly felt: a simple 
correlation matrix (see appendix, Table A1) shows that the pressure for all tasks are positively 
related. The fact that the pressure to publish and the pressure to acquire grants is well established 
(Waaijer, Teelken, Wouters, & van der Weijden, 2018) and perhaps self-evident nowadays 
because obtaining tenure depends having obtained grants and reviewers of grants (at the time of 
measurement) are always asked to look at the track record of applicants.5 Teaching and 
administrative duties are often left out of the equation but is a task that is inherently tied to being 
an academic. Leaving out these elements is unfortunate, because in todays’ universities in 
Western countries mass education has become the rule in which faculty have to deal with rising 
student numbers. Hence, when the pressure goes up in, e.g., teaching, this is positively associated 
with a higher pressure in publication or in funding. An open question is whether the different 
groups in particular by position experience and report different levels of pressure. But, of course, 
to understand the context even better age, nationality, gender or the university where economists 
work are also of interest. Table 2 offers a set of equations (simultaneously estimated) that offer 
some insights as to who perceives the pressure to be high. 
The publication pressure is perceived to be the highest among assistant and associate 
professors. This accords well with a study by Haven, Bouter, Smulders, and Tijdink (2019) who 
focus on different disciplines at four academic institutions in Amsterdam. These are indeed the 
crucial periods in a modern university career when tenure and promotion depend to a large extent 
on one’s publication record. What is perhaps more noteworthy is that the actual publication 
productivity – as a proxy for publication skills - does not soften the pressure: whether you 
publish a lot or just one or two articles in internationally refereed journals the pressure does not 
subside.  
                                                          
5 Recently, the Dutch Science Foundation (NWO) has changed this practice and as of 2020 candidates for a grant 




Table 2: Explaining the pressure to publish, acquire funds, teach and administer (based on 1-10 
scale) 
 Perceived pressure to 
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Adj. R2 0.19 0.18 0.11 0.25 
N = 319, estimated by means of three stage simultaneous equation estimation. Standard errors are between brackets 




The pressure increases until one has reached the position of full professor where it slightly 
decreases, which may be a selection effect as this group has attained the skills to publish their 
research more easily, but it could also be the release of pressure because the final hurdle in a 
career has been taken. However, although these coefficients differ, equality tests show that 
differences between coefficients are not statistically significant.6 In other words, contrary to what 
one might expect the publication pressure is not higher among junior members (PhD students 
and assistant professors) compared to more senior faculty, like associate and full professors. The 
publication pressure obviously does not subside substantially once one becomes an insider in 
academia. 
Other observations that deserve some attention is the extra pressure felt by foreign faculty 
members. This is felt not only in the pressure to publish but also in acquiring research funds. An 
obvious reason why foreign faculty experience this pressure is not easily found as statements 
made by foreign faculty are not so prominent, but it could well be that getting accustomed to a 
new culture may offer extra pressure, and compared to Dutch speaking academics they do not 
have the fallback option in taking on a position outside the university in case one does not attain 
tenure. An alternative explanation may be that foreign faculty may also be more oriented towards 
the international academic job market7 in which they are well aware that attaining a job at a 
prestigious university requires publications in top journals. Some differences are also to be noted 
with respect to the university of employment. The pressure is more less the same at the 
universities in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Tilburg and Utrecht. At the universities of Groningen and 
Maastricht it is somewhat lower compared to the University of Amsterdam, but the pressure is 
considerably lower at the small departments scattered around the county: 1.65 points. This 
category is a mix of (small) economics departments at Leiden, Delft and Nijmegen that are not 
independent units but part of larger whole. Perhaps because of their substantially smaller group 
size and the lack of visibility as an economics department, they enjoy perhaps more freedom 
                                                          
6 Equality tests based on model Table 2 show that Prob > chi2 between assistant and associate coefficients is 0.61; 
between assistant and full professor 0.56; and between associate and full professor 0.64. 
7 In part this may also be a result of the preferential tax treatment (Extra territorial costs, ETC) which in the past 
allowed scientists a tax reduction of 30% for the duration of 8 years. Nowadays this tax regime is from 2019 
onwards more aligned with other European countries and one can get this preferential treatment for 5 years. 
Research for the government by Vankan et al. (2016) shows that 80 percent of recipients of this tax program have 
moved onwards to another country within 5 years. 
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from the publication pressure.  But it could also be a result of the fact that in research evaluations 
their work is not held to the same standard as regular economics faculties.  
Finally, with respect to gender we cannot detect any pressure differences across male and 
female academics, although in the Netherlands there are mounting complaints about the barriers 
that female academics experience in particular in economics. In our sample women report a 
higher publication pressure (8.3) than men (7.8), but this seems to be composition effect as there 
are more women in assistant professorship positions than men, and also far more female 
respondents of foreign nationality (52%) compared to male respondents (28%). 
 With respect to the tasks of teaching, administration and acquiring research funds one can 
see that the academic position is of crucial importance: compared to PhDs the funding pressure 
keeps on mounting as the positions become more senior. With respect to teaching, the pressure is 
more or less equal across the various professorship statuses. However, it is approximately 1.1 
points higher than the pressure experienced by PhDs. With respect to the affiliation, it should be 
noted that teaching pressure is quite uniform, whereas the pressure to acquire grants and perform 
administrative duties is characterized by some differences. Compared to our benchmark 
university the pressure to acquire research grants is almost everywhere higher. There are some 
signs that the smaller sized universities (Utrecht and mixture of Delft, Leiden and Nijmegen) 
experience higher grant pressure, which is an effect that has also been noted by Murray et al. 
(2016) for the case of Canada. The smaller size is also reflected in a higher pressure to perform 
administrative duties. 
 
5. The consequences of the publish-or-perish principle 
 
5.1 Are economists divided on the pros and cons of publish-or-perish? 
To gauge the effects of how the publish-or-perish principle affects academic life, we first want to 
discover how economists perceive the consequences of the pressure to publish in international 
refereed journals in general. In short, are they optimistic about the merits of this pressure or are 
they pessimistic? The impression is that economist perceive both the positive – upward mobility 
and improvement quality of research - and negative sides of publication pressure, to wit, turning 
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your back on national issues, excessive publication and unethical behavior. Agreement on all 
items varies between 63 and 71 percent. This suggestion of consensus could be a false 
impression as not every respondent weights each item equally. To explore this issue in more 
depth, a latent class analysis (LCA) is performed to test whether we can detect a divide into 
different groups among economists.8 
 
Table 3: The pros and cons of pressure to publish in peer-reviewed journals 










1. Improves upward mobility in 
academic life 
2.8 12.7 16.4 46.3 21.8 100.0 
2. Makes researchers turn their 
back on national issues 
4.4 16.3 16.8 46.8 15.7 100.0 
3. Leads to an excessive number 
of papers which are hardly read 
2.7 15.8 12.8 35.3 33.4 100.0 
4. Improves the quality of 
research as a result of peer 
review 
5.7 16.5 14.3 46.8 16.8 100.0 
5. Increases the probability of 
unethical behavior like fraud or 
data manipulation 
3.6 12.9 22.7 44.5 16.3 100.0 
(a) For matters of comparison the ‘don’t know’ category has not been presented.  
 
 
Table 4 shows that there are two clear types of economists: those quite skeptical of the publish-
or-perish principle: the positive sides receive lower weights than the negative sides. This is quite 
different among the optimists or the true believers of the publish-or-perish principle: the positive 
sides are clearly perceived by this group, whereas the downsides are given short shrift. 
 
 
                                                          
8 The LCA is based on the five items of Table 3 transformed to binary items (0 = (fully) disagree/neutral; 1 = (fully) 
agree). We first compared a one-class model with a two class model.  Based on the AIC and BIC we preferred the 
two-class model over the one-class model, which suggests that the sample of economists consists of at least two sub-
groups. A three-class model was also used but the estimation process did not converge, which may be because of the 
small sample size and small set of items used to test this model. 
16 
 
Table 4: Latent class marginal means for a two-class model of economistsa  
The pressure to publish in peer-
reviewed journals… 
Class 1: Skeptics of 
publish-or-perish 
principle 
Class 2: Optimists of 
publish-or-perish 
principle 












3. Leads to an excessive number of 





4. Improves the quality of research as a 





5. Increases the probability of unethical 





   
Latent class marginal probabilities 0.69 0.31 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 2200.23 
Bayes’ Information Criterion (BIC) 2243.37 
N 373 
(a) LCA based on the five items of Table 3 transformed to binary items (0 = (fully) disagree/neutral; 1 = (fully) agree). Standard 
errors between brackets. 
 
To see whether these two classes differ across a number of structural background factors of 
respondents, Table 5 offers a hierarchical logit analysis of the probability whether an economist 
is an optimist (with the skeptical economist as base category). The basic model (1) is extended in 
column (2) with the work pressure (publish, teach, acquire funds, and administration) to see 
whether work pressure is related to the fact that one is a skeptic or an optimist. Four aspects of 
Table 5 deserve some attention. First, whether one is a prolific academic or not, this does not 
appear to affect one’s position on the publish-or-perish principle. To some extent this is 
surprising as one would think that prolific scholars are treated well by the system, whereas 
scholars who do not have “the itch to write” and have difficulty in getting their work published 







Table 5: Logit model explaining whether economists belong to the class of optimists (with 
skeptics as benchmark) 
 Probability being optimist about publish-or-perish 
 (1) (2) 
















Position (PhD student = 0)   




















University of employment (University of 
Amsterdam = 0) 
  




























Pressure to:   




    Acquire funds - -0.05 
(0.07) 








   
N 319 319 
Pseudo R2 0.10 0.11 




Second, assistant, associate and full professors are shown to be more prone to being believers in 
the publish-or-perish system than other positions. The position of assistant professor is more in 
line with the findings of Niles et al. (2020). This is often a precarious position to move on up the 
academic ladder one has to believe that a system based on the publish-or-perish principle is by 
and large a good system. The fact that (tenured) associate and in particular full professors are 
found to be true believers of this system is in contradiction with the findings of Niles et al. 
(2020). Still, one can imagine why they may be leaning to being optimistic about the system: full 
professors are the faculty members who have attained tenure by fulfilling the requirements of the 
system and they are the living proof that the system works, at least for them personally.9 
However, one should note that despite the fact that they are more supportive of the principle of 
publish-or-perish than junior faculty, it does not mean that full professors as a group are 
supportive the publish-or-perish principle: the majority of full professors is skeptic (56%), but 
compared to all the other positions this percentage is relatively low (e.g., 75% of PhDs and 66% 
of assistant professors are far more skeptical).  
A third finding to be noted from Table 5 is that most universities are very much alike. 
Only economists situated at the University of Utrecht and to a lesser extent at the small 
departments of Leiden, Nijmegen and Delft are far less likely to be optimists. A plausible 
reasons to explain the stance of Utrecht economists is the fact that the department strives to be 
multidisciplinary. For such faculty it may be hard to show to the outside world its true identity as 
the yard stick of ‘straight’ economics departments is not the yard stick with which this university 
desires to be measured.10 Furthermore, as Leahey (2018) shows interdisciplinary research moves 
at a slower pace than monodisciplinary research and achieving recognition is not an easy feat. 
And a fourth finding is that the perceived work pressure (see model 2) is not associated 
with being an optimist. The pressure across all four tasks is found to be more or less equal across 
the two classes. This is an important fact because being optimistic about the publish-or-perish 
                                                          
9 Detailed analysis of the individual items (see appendix, Table A3) shows full professors are far more adamant than 
assistant professors in supporting the publish-or-perish culture: they stress the positive aspects and firmly deny the 
possibility that the publication pressure increases the probability of unethical behavior. Assistant professor only 
stress the positive sides of the system. 
10 The same may also apply to the universities of Leiden and Nijmegen. The Leiden department is situated at the 
Leiden Law School and has a more practical orientation and Nijmegen School of Management has a pluralistic and 
practical approach in some ways similar to Utrecht. 
19 
 
principle is not directly related to lower work pressure. In other words, one’s attitude towards the 
publish-or-perish principle seems to be genuine and not a case of ‘sour grapes’ in terms of 
skeptics having a higher work pressure and optimist a lower work pressure. 
 
5.2 The effects on the work environment and science as institution 
The previous results show that economists see both the pros and the cons tied to stressing 
publication in internationally refereed journals. But how do economists perceive the effects of 
publication pressure on their work environment and how science as an institution functions? And 
how strong are the differences between the skeptics and the optimists among the economists? 
Table 6 gives a general overview of the opinions of economists. If we restrict our 
attention to the most strongly held opinions it is clear that academics feel disconnected with what 
their employer desires. Most economists (62%) have become quite cynical as they perceive that 
‘their’ university does not care what they publish, only how much and in which journals, 
preferably the much prized top journals, like American Economic Review, Econometrica, 
Journal of Finance and other high impact journals. High impact journal articles further, of 
course, the prestige of universities. But another reason why a divide among faculty seems to 
form is the fact that publications in Dutch language journals are not recognized by their 
organization as a scientific contribution (75% perceive this to be the case). In line with national 
initiatives to promote the ‘valorization’ of science, Dutch publications are seen as a form of 
applied science and they generally do not count as scientific contributions in research 
assessments of individuals or universities. This double message may be a reason for cynicism 
among the faculty that does make an effort to write for a broader audience. A clear consequence 
of the publication pressure can be seen in the fourth statement where 33 percent of the faculty 
has thought of leaving academia, and just a small majority (52%) disagrees with this statement. 
When we turn to the way science functions in Table 6, most economists are strong 
believers in the benefits of the peer review system (59%). On the other hand, most economists 
(59%) are quite dissatisfied with the allocation funds in the Netherlands as they do not see that 
public funds flow to the most original researchers. Other statements do not generate a clear 
consensus, but this fact may also be telling. One would, for instance, expect a firm agreement on 
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one of the Mertonian norms in science, viz. the way knowledge is created and published is 
transparent (Merton, 1973). Instead merely 37 percent agrees and 29 percent disagrees.  
 
Table 6: Satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the publish-or-perish culture in academia 








       
Work environment university       
       
1. My organization does not care 
what I publish, only how much and 
in which journals 
6.7 17.6 13.7 34.3 27.9 100.0 
2. Publishing in Dutch is not 
recognized by my organization as a 
scientific contribution 
2.8 11.0 11.7 39.6 35.0 100.0 
3. Being cited or respected by other 
scholars is what motivates me most 
in my work 
7.8 28.6 26.2 30.5 7.0 100.0 
4. Universities are embracing the 
norms and values of firms 
5.2 31.9 28.6 27.7 6.7 100.0 
5. Because of the publication 
pressure I have thought about leaving 
academia 
21.8 29.7 15.5 21.0 12.0 100.0 
       
How science works       
6. The knowledge produced by 
economists is contested and corrected 
by their peers 
3.6 12.2 25.5 53.1 5.6 100.0 
7. Current generation of economists 
in (Dutch) universities will bring 
forth a future Nobel Prize winner 
18.1 47.3 26.7 6.5 1.4 100.0 
8. Public funds for scientific research 
flow to the most original researchers 
14.8 44.2 22.7 16.6 1.7 100.0 
9. Economists are too much a slave 
of fashions in  economic theory and 
policy 
5.4 18.6 27.1 36.9 12.0 100.0 
10. The way economic knowledge is 
created and published is transparent 
8.0 21.1 33.8 35.3 1.8 100.0 
(a) For matters of comparison the ‘don’t know’ category has not been presented. 
 
But how do the two classes of economists – the optimists and the skeptics - perceive the way 
science functions? Table 7 gives the levels of agreement and disagreement and across each and 
every statement the two classes differ or are complete opposites at conventional levels of 
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significance (5% or less). To give an example of opposite positions, skeptics are not strongly 
motivated (41%) by citations or respect of other scholars, whereas optimists are in large part 
(48%) motivated by these forms of recognition. Clear differences in work practice are to be 
noticed in the degree how universities are perceived as appreciating the content of the work of 
respondents: 70 percent of the skeptics agree that universities don’t care about the content, 
whereas optimists leave more doubt: 44 percent agrees with this statement. 
 
Table 7: Different perceptions about work environment and science across two latent classes of 
economists 
 Class 1: Skeptics Class 2: Optimists N 
Statements:  % disagree % agree % disagree % agree  
Work environment university      
      
1. My organization does not care 
what I publish, only how much and 
in which journals. 
19.4 70.4 34.8 43.8 359 
2. Publishing in Dutch is not 
recognized by my organization as a 
scientific contribution 
13.3 76.0 14.9 71.3 326 
3. Being cited or respected by other 
scholars is what motivates me most 
in my work 
41.4 32.8 25.2 47.8 371 
4. Universities are embracing the 
norms and values of firms 
33.6 40.2 45.0 21.0 329 
5. Because of the publication 
pressure I have thought about leaving 
academia 
44.7 40.3 66.7 16.7 367 
      
How science works      
6. The knowledge produced by 
economists is contested and corrected 
by their peers 
20.9 53.1 3.6 72.4 337 
7. Current generation of economists 
in (Dutch) universities will bring 
forth a future Nobel Prize winner 
71.1 6.7 51.8 10.8 277 
8. Public funds for scientific research 
flow to the most original researchers 
65.7 14.9 43.1 26.5 344 
9. Economists are too much a slave 
of fashions in  economic theory and 
policy 
13.8 62.5 46.4 19.1 350 
10. The way economic knowledge is 
created and published is transparent 
36.6 25.2 11.1 65.7 337 
(a) For matters of comparison the ‘don’t know’ category has not been presented. 
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When we turn to the way science is perceived to function, the skeptics are quite convinced (63%) 
that economists are too much a slave of fashions in economic theory and policy (Sunstein, 2000). 
Optimists are of the opposite opinion as 46 percent disagrees with this statement. A similar 
divide can be noticed in the way economic knowledge is produced and published: 37 percent of 
the skeptics disagrees that this process is transparent, whereas the optimists are very convinced 
(66%) that this is the case. 
With these strong divergent opinions between skeptics and optimists, it may come as no 
surprise that skeptics show a far stronger inclination to exit academia: 40 percent has thought 
about leaving academia, against 17 percent of the optimists. To discover in more detail whether 
there are signs that predict the occurrence of these thoughts we also carried out an ordered logit 
analysis on the individual items (appendix Table A4). The most striking element of this analysis 
is that no structural characteristic seems to matter. This suggests that thinking about leaving is 
not tied to any position and this is to some extent remarkable. For instance, one would have 
expected a strong effect for those economists working in junior positions because this is a stage 
in a career where people may have doubts about staying on in science. The only characteristic  
that is of some importance is the publication productivity: if you are a prolific writer these 
thoughts do not arise, at least not as strong as they do for those who have a weak publication 
profile. Besides of course, being skeptical about the publish-or-perish principle, this is a 
plausible outcome as academic life whether you are a PhD-student or a full professor is not 
satisfactory life when you publish very little and assessment exercises that are regularly held 
make this public. 
 
6. Conclusions and discussion 
The economist and Nobel laureate Paul Samuelson (1962) once summarized what intrinsically 
motivates scientists: “In the long run, the economic scholar only works for the only coin worth 
having – our own applause.” This idealized version of how science works and the underlying 
motivations of scholars can be traced in the early literature on the economics of science 
(Stephan, 1996). The race to solving the great puzzles of a science as well as gaining recognition 
by one’s peers was highly prized, money or employment was of secondary importance or at most 
a spinoff. However, with the increasing importance of bibliometrics in driving rewards, 
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promotion and tenure in everyday university life (Stephan, 2012) “the applause” of peers has 
become instrumental in securing lifetime income and employment. To act in accordance with 
these metrics has become a dominant strategy for academics (Casadevall & Fang, 2014). 
Competition for funding, prestige and positions within academia are so strong (Anderson, 
Ronning, De Vries, & Martinson, 2007) that the pressure to publish is always present. In the 
process of writing grant proposals it has become more or less standard and sometimes mandatory 
to include the impact factor of the published articles to inform and persuade reviewers.  
 The current paper has focused on whether this instrumental use of indicators of science – 
summarized in this paper as a publish-or-perish principle - has left its mark on how academic 
economists perceive their work environment and the scientific integrity of their discipline. First 
of all, the pressure to publish is considered high by the majority of faculty. And contrary to 
common wisdom – that this pressure only affects the young and precarious like PhDs and post-
docs - this study shows that in particular the senior staff experiences high pressure and 
significantly more so than PhD students. This pressure also colors one’s outlook on the academic 
environment. Although most academics agree that the pressure to publish in international 
refereed journals has its intended merits it also it is also perceived to have clear unintended 
negative consequences. Among economists we discover a clear divide between the skeptics and 
the true believers of the publish-or-perish principle, with the skeptics representing a clear 
majority of the faculty. In particular, the perception of skeptics that their employer – the 
university – only cares about how much one publishes and in which journal and not about the 
content of their publication is a tell-tale sign of disconnectedness.11 Finally, the prospect of 
leaving academia is to a large degree inspired by the dissatisfaction with publish-or-perish 
principle as well as one’s ability to publish. These thoughts of leaving academia are not just felt 
by PhDs or assistant professors – stages in an academic career where these doubts and feelings 
are normal - but at every rank in academia.  
These findings have, of course, their limitations as the data are restricted to a cross-
section of economists working in Dutch universities and the statistical analysis naturally cannot 
                                                          
11 The fact that journal publications in Dutch are not counted and seen as a scientific contribution is to some extent 
understandable as these journals do not have the same standards of peer reviews and large audiences that English or 
American journals have, but it apparently is an element of considerable frustration; a frustration that is expected to 
be shared by economists of ‘small’ countries that also have to make their research known to two audiences if they 
want to remain relevant to those two ‘masters’: an English and a local (non-English speaking) audience. 
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cover issues of causality or trace how careers and attitudes develop over time. Still, the attitudes 
and opinions stated by these economists cannot be easily dismissed and some findings may 
trigger further research. When most academics are skeptical if not outright negative about the 
publish-or-perish principle why are changes then not enacted? Straightforward answers are 
unfortunately not available. The main difficulty with metrics is that “the genie is out of the 
bottle” and putting it back inside the bottle is fraught with pitfalls as the ‘good old days’ may, 
first of all, represent an idealized version of science. Second, the university of the past has been 
superseded by a completely different academic environment. The modern-day university is 
functioning in a highly competitive and globalized labor market and a market for ideas which has 
become highly specialized and fragmented. Furthermore, the university is geared to and depends 
on mass education. In this environment, tackling management problems with metrics or ‘critical 
performance indicators’ seems logical to managers, but can backfire as the current study and 
many others suggest. For instance, ambitious deans or managers may be tempted to promote 
mission statements that are unrealistic (“we will belong to the global top-10 of research 
universities”) placing employees in positions to resort to unethical means in order to attain that 
status. Resolving ethical dilemmas is not easily achieved (Zhang, Gino, & Bazerman, 2014), but 
it may start with getting away from the ranking games at individual and institutional levels 
(Adler & Harzing, 2009; Biagioli & Csiszar, 2020; Osterloh & Frey, 2015). And resolving the 
‘funding or famine’-stress may perhaps start to seeking less bureaucratic procedures and 
exploiting the wisdom of the scientific crowd (see Bollen et al. (2017)). 
On a more general level, the unintended consequences can be detrimental to the way 
social science like economics is practiced. Economics is both a science and an art and it takes all 
sorts of scholars to solve grand puzzles and transfer knowledge. Excessive focus on science 
indicators may lead management to overvalue certain type of scientists and undervalue other 
types. The making and education of economists may lead to a monoculture in which the 
Academic Professional dominates and has lost touch with the Political Economist (Colander, 
2011). The different tasks of an academic economist encompass so many dimensions that are not 
easily measured or weighted, and common metrics as a management tool may only give non-
specialists the illusion that they have taken an informed decision. Misrecognition of qualities is a 
serious impediment to economics as a science. For instance, in case  of institutions concerning 
promotion and tenure are heavily influenced by tenured scientists who display homophily – they 
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favor tenure candidates who adhere to their paradigm – sciences lacking experimental evidence 
can become dominated by people adhering to what Akerlof and Michaillat (2018) call false 
paradigms. It is a matter of judgement whether economics can be described as this type of 
science, but scholars like Fourcade et al. (2015) and Colander (2015) have noted that economics 
has all the traits of being trapped in the bubble of an elite set of universities. Furthermore, 
institutions and social norms within a science may push scientists in roles that do not match their 
qualities or take advantage of their comparative advantages. The critique of Akerlof (2020) is in 
that respect relevant. He points out that the current institutions of publication and promotion 
offer biased incentives that lead to what he calls ‘the sins of omission’: economics as discipline 
tends to ignores important topics and problems that are difficult to measure in a ‘hard’ way. 
Qualitative research is, for instance, more difficult to publish than quantitative research. And 
scholars who like to benefit from the insights generated in other disciplines and offer 
interdisciplinary insights often take the slower route as it is harder to appreciate their 
contributions as Leahey, Beckman, and Stanko (2017) show. 
In short, a real appreciation of scholars cannot be summarized looking up one’s H-index 
or field weighted impact factor in the Web of Science, Google Scholar, Scopus or any other 
citation database. To return to the advice of Samuelson which he gave by expressing that implicit 
incentives - applause is our only coin worth having - are at the heart of practicing economic 
science. A real appreciation of a scholarly achievement starts with having intimate knowledge of 
the field and a patience to see ideas tested and tried.12 And in designing ‘incentive’ structures in 
science perhaps there is only one good advice: be aware that scientific knowledge is not a private 
good and science is not a market. The interests of science are likely to be best served by 
appealing to the intrinsic motivation of scientists. Or to cite the lesson pointed out by Arrow 
(1987) when he was discussing the priority system in science:  “Society is more ingenious than 
the market.” (p.687) 
 
 
                                                          
12 In a forgotten footnote to this much cited quote he adds that: “This is not a plea for ‘Art for its own sake’ [..]. It is 
a plea for calling shots as they really appear to be (after reflection and after weighing all evidence), even when this 
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Table A1: Pairwise correlations between academic tasks 
 Teaching Publication Funding Administration 
Teaching 1.00    
Publication 0.30*** 1.00   
Funding 0.30*** 0.39*** 1.00  
Administration 0.44*** 0.19*** 0.48*** 1.00 
 




Table A2: Differences in pressure across latent classes among economists 
 Class 1: Skeptics Class 2: Optimists t-test 
Perceived pressure (1-10) to: grade s.e. grade s.e.  
      
     Publish 7.87 0.13 7.76 0.17 0.52 
     Acquire research funds 6.25 0.18 6.16 0.22 0.29 
     Teaching classes 6.44 0.14 6.39 0.19 0.24 
     Administrative duties 5.45 0.16 5.57 0.24 0.41 
      































































Position (PhD = 0)      


















































Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 
N 335 344 349 351 338 
In analyzing these items, we have left out the ‘don’t know’ category. All equations are analyzed by means of 
ordered logit analysis, cut-off thresholds are not presented. The other controls concern the university where 
respondents are employed. Standard errors are between brackets and significance levels are denoted by * p < 0.1; ** 





























































































































Position (PhD = 0)           




































































































Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.06 
N 341 308 353 311 349 322 341 326 331 322 
In analyzing these items, we have left out the ‘don’t know’ category. All equations are analyzed by means of ordered logit analysis. The other controls concern 
the university where respondents are employed.  Standard errors are between brackets and significance levels are denoted by * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; and *** p < 
0.01. 
 
